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This paper examines the economic and noneconomic determinants of growth disparity among 
Chinese villages between 1990 and 2002. By estimating a growth equation, first, we confirm 
a significant positive effect of the initial level of human capital, as well as the initial condition 
of physical infrastructure. Second, social capital measured by the degree of stable social 
relations at the village level is also a significant growth-promoting factor. The policy 
implications of our findings are that public policy promoting social stability in rural areas 
should be strengthened, as well as increasing financial support for rural education and 
infrastructure construction, especially in lower income regions. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines economic and noneconomic determinants of the difference in income 
growth among Chinese villages from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, using the Barro-type 
growth regression approach.
1 The period of estimation is 1990–2002. We focus on the 
significance of human capital and social capital. 
In addition to a general interest in within-country disparity in the growth literature (e.g., 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, Sala-i-Martin 1996), the importance of empirical research on 
growth disparity in rural areas is apparent in the context of studies on contemporary China. 
The problem is which regional unit should be chosen as the unit of research. Every regional 
unit has its own advantages and disadvantages as a unit of study. Most recent studies on 
regional growth and inequality in postreform China used province-level data (see, for 
example, Chen and Fleisher 1996, Chen and Wu (2005), Fleisher et al. 2007, Lin and Liu 
2000, Yao and Zhang 2001). Several studies such as Jones et al. (2003) and Wei (1993) 
conducted city-based estimation. 
As Jones et al. (2003) argued, city-based analysis is preferable to province-based 
analysis in order to identify the effects of specific development policies and other 
politicoeconomic factors on regional growth. In the context of rural development, county 
(xian)-level investigation is equivalent to city-level analysis. This paper, however, focuses on 
the lowest level of the party/governmental hierarchy; that is, the administrative village 
 
1 For a discussion of the basic concept of a regional growth regression, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992 and 
Sala-i-Martin 1996.   3
                                                
(xingzhengcun, hereinafter referred to as village).
2 The reason why this paper sets the village 
as the unit of analysis comes from the results of field research. Researchers who have 
conducted field surveys in rural China are aware that the place of residence matters very much 
to the income-generating activities of peasant households, not only at the macro- and micro-
region levels but also at the village level. Several previous studies focused on the importance 
of regional factors at lower levels. Rozelle (1994) examined the determinants of the growth of 
income disparity among townships in Jiangsu. Knight and Li (1997), based on a village study 
in the Handan district, Hebei Province, discussed the “cumulative causation” at the village 
level that affected economic disparity among villages within a micro-region. Using data 
collected in suburban Tianjin, Perkins (2003) demonstrated that large economic variations 
existed among villages in a township, including wide differences in size, economic structure, 
and levels of well-being. Sato (2003) provided a typology of market development at the 
village level, based on a series of village and household surveys in five provinces. Gustafsson 
and Ding (2006), using the same data as this paper, compared the socioeconomic conditions 
of villages where the ethnic minorities live against those of villages where people of Han 
ethnicity live. They found that the level of industrialization, inputs in agricultural production, 
and stock of human capital, as well as indicators of path dependency, all affect the economic 
situation of the ethnic minorities’ villages. 
It may be claimed that the deepening of marketization in rural China after the 1990s—
for example, the development of rural–urban migration and the privatization of Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs)— has weakened the influence of village authority on households’ 
 
2 We conduct a county-based analysis that focuses on the effects of local public finance on regional growth in 
our future study.   4
economic activities. At the same time, it may be argued that recent politicoeconomic reforms 
in rural areas—such as tax reform (abolition of agricultural tax and local levies), the 
restructuring of the local administrative system (e.g., cuncaixiangguan zhidu; that is, budget 
and fiscal control of township government over administrative villages) and the reform of the 
household registration system—also weakened the direct influence of the village-level 
political economy over peasant households. However, village-based analysis is still valid. 
First, such reforms themselves have occurred in a highly decentralized manner, and there is 
large regional heterogeneity even at city or county levels. At the same time, part of the reform 
policies, such as village elections, introduced new sociopolitical heterogeneity at the village 
level that might influence households’ economic behavior. Second, politicoeconomic changes 
after the 1990s might have redefined the role of village authority, rather than simply reducing 
its importance. For example, instead of allocating economic resources directly, the village 
might have become important as an intermediary of outside funds, a representative of the 
villagers’ interests, or a mediator of internal conflicts, which directly and indirectly influences 
villagers’ economic outcomes. Third, as recent studies on rural China have found, social 
capital at the community level is an important determinant of the economic conditions of 
peasant families (see for example, Tsai 2007, Chen et al. 2008, Sato 2008). Although rural 
community does not necessary overlaps with administrative village, it is still meaningful to 
investigate whether the level of social capital at the village level affect the economic 
condition of villagers.  
The main data source of this paper is the village data set compiled from the 
administrative village questionnaire and household questionnaire of the Chinese Household   5
                                                
Income Project (CHIP) for 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 2002 CHIP data set).
3 The 
2002 CHIP data set covers 961 administrative villages in 22 provinces. The sampling frame 
of the CHIP household survey is a subsample of the official annual household survey by the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Our village data cover the villages where the NBS’s 
official sample households live. Most of the data were gathered by asking village officials 
(party secretary, head of village committee, or village accountant) to fill out the questionnaire 
by referring to official village statistics. 
Regarding the data on village mean income, we collected per capita annual net income 
of peasant households (nongmin renjun chunshouru) for 1990, 1998, and 2002. Table 1 
summarizes the village mean income in 2002. The overall average is 2471 yuan, and the 
averages by the three macro-regions are 3518 yuan for the eastern region, 2068 yuan for the 
central region, and 1653 yuan for the western region respectively. A large income disparity 
occurs across macro-regions. This table also shows the decomposition of inequality in village 
mean income into the within-province and the between-province components. Regarding the 
overall inequality in village mean income, the share of between-province disparity (60 
percent) is larger than that of the within-province inequality (40 percent). However, when we 
divide the sample villages into three macro-regions, we find that the within-province 
inequality dominates in the central and western regions: 92 percent and 80 percent 
respectively. This finding is supportive of our approach of focusing on a lower administrative 
unit within province. 
Table 1 here 
 
3 See Gustafsson et al. (2008) for the sampling frame and the survey methodology of the CHIPS survey.   6
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, following Jones et al. (2003), we 
provide a framework for a village-based growth regression and estimate the baseline equation. 
Then in Section 3, we extend the growth equation by employing a social capital variable. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2. Baseline growth equation 
Jones et al. (2003) estimated a city-based Barro-type growth equation, using average annual 
growth of real per capita GDP between 1989 and 1999 as the dependent variable. Their 
baseline estimation employed the following explanatory variables: initial level of income 
(1989 per capita GDP), population growth (average annual growth rate), investment ratio 
(average ratios of domestic/foreign investments to GDP), level of human capital (average 
ratio of senior high school students to total population), initial level of physical infrastructure 
(highway construction in 1989), and initial level of government expenditure (ratio of city 
government expenditure to GDP in 1989). 
Following Jones et al. (2003), we take two steps in our empirical investigation. As the 
first step, we estimate a baseline growth equation that employs initial level of income, 
population growth, initial level of human capital, initial condition of physical infrastructure, 
and geographical conditions (note that we cannot include physical capital investment rate 
because of data availability). Then, as the second step, we elaborate our baseline growth 
equation by employing social capital. 
As mentioned above, the period of estimation is 1990–2002. A trimmed data set that 
contains 870 villages in 21 provinces is used in the following estimations. All the villages of 
Hunan Province are omitted because data on 1990 income are missing. Villages that were   7
                                                
merged with neighboring villages during the 1990s are also excluded. Other deleted 
observations are because of outliers or missing data in the relevant variables. 
Definitions of the variables and descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 2. The 
dependent variable is annual growth rate of village mean income during the period 1990–
2002. Village mean income for 1990 is employed as the measure of the initial level of income. 
Although the income figures are based on the official village statistics, it can still be claimed 
that village mean income might be biased. For 2002, the national average of annual rural 
household income calculated from the NBS’s official household survey was 2476 yuan. This 
figure is almost the same as the grand average of our sample villages (2471 yuan). For 1990, 
the grand average of our sample villages in 2002 prices is 1343 yuan. This is also close to the 
NBS’s national average of annual rural household income deflated by the rural CPI (1310 
yuan).
4 Because the figures for village mean income were, in principle, collected from village 
documents, it is safe to say that the data for village mean income for both years are reliable. 
However, we should still consider the possible bias in the income data. We make the 
following two points. First, in order to limit the influence of outliers, we employ robust 
regression. Specifically, we remove outliers for which Cook’s D > 1 and then iteratively 
select weights for the remaining observations (Hamilton 1991). Second, considering the 
incentives of local officials, the initial income of lower income regions might have a 
downward bias because it is politically preferable for village cadres to report higher growth 
rates. If this is the case, there might be a spurious convergence in regional growth 
performance. As De Long (1988) argued, the problem of spurious convergence is important in 
 
4 See National Bureau of Statistics (2003, 27) for the national average of the annual rural household income for 
2002 and 1990. The nominal income for 1990 was 686 yuan. Data on rural CPI (nongcun jumin xiaofei jiage 
zhishu) are collected from the NBS (2003), China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe.   8
                                                
the empirical growth convergence literature. However, because our aim does not involve 
testing the convergence hypothesis, the possible bias in initial income is not critical for the 
following discussion. 
Table 2 here 
In addition to the initial level of income, we employ the following four explanatory 
variables in the baseline growth regression. 
(1) Population growth. This variable controls the negative effect of population growth 
on income growth in per capita terms. Unfortunately, historical demographic data are only 
available for 1998. Under the assumption that there is no significant difference between the 
population growth rate of 1990–2002 and 1998–2002, we use the annual growth rate of 
population for 1998–2002. We expect a negative coefficient for the population growth rate. 
(2) Initial level of human capital. The growth regression literature usually uses the 
school-enrollment rate to measure human capital investment. Because of data availability, the 
existing literature on regional growth in China such as Chen and Fleisher (1996), Jones et al. 
(2003) used the total number of students in senior high school divided by the total population. 
Because neither the school-enrollment rate nor the total number of students is available, here 
we employ the average years of education. Specifically, based on the household questionnaire, 
we estimated the average years of education of the villagers who were of working age (age 
16–60) in 1990. We expect a positive coefficient for this human capital variable.
5 
 
5 It may be claimed that the data on educational level are biased because well-educated villagers are more likely 
to live away from home. We believe that the censoring of well-educated villagers is not a problem because our 
data include not only ‘resident family members (changzhu renkou)’ but also ‘nonresident family members (fei 
changzhu renkou)’.   9
(3) Initial condition of physical infrastructure. The level of infrastructure development 
at the initial stage will affect subsequent regional growth. As the proxy of the initial state of 
physical infrastructure, we employ dummy variables indicating the year the village was 
equipped with electricity. 
(4) Geographical location. We employ dummy variables for plains (pingyuan), hilly 
areas (qiuling), and mountainous areas (shanqu) as the indicator of geographical advantage. 
Compared with hilly areas, we expect a positive coefficient for plains and a negative 
coefficient for mountainous areas. 
The estimation results of the baseline growth equation are summarized in Table 3. The 
first column shows the result of the OLS estimation. The second column reports the results of 
the robust regression that controls for the effect of outliers. Both sets of results are consistent 
and suggest that, controlling for population growth, initial level of income, and geographical 
location, both the initial conditions of physical infrastructure and human capital have 
expected influences on subsequent income growth. First, the initial level of education has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the subsequent growth performance, although 
the impact is not large. One additional year of a village’s average years of education raises the 
growth rate by approximately a 0.2–0.3 percentage point. Second, the initial condition of 
physical infrastructure has a large and significant effect on income growth. We assume that 
the earlier the village was equipped with electricity, the higher the income growth during the 
1990s. 
Table 3 here   10
3. Role of social capital on growth 
As the second step of our empirical research, we extend the baseline estimation by 
introducing social capital at the village level into the equation. 
Generally, social capital is conceptualized as the level of trust, the degree to which 
common norms are shared, and the density of associational activities among community 
members (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000). Narayan and Pritchett (1999), using a village 
survey in Tanzania, discussed how household income depends greatly on the village-level 
social capital, specifically, the extent and characteristics of the villagers’ associational 
activities. According to their study, the proximate channels through which village social 
capital influences household income are: better public services, more community activity, and 
greater use of credit. 
It would be interesting to examine whether social capital at the community level 
exhibits positive externalities in rural China. Given the general context of rural China, 
however, the link between community-level associational activities and household income 
may not be relevant. This is because such activities are not common in general and because 
the administrative village is not necessarily a suitable unit of observation for such activities. 
Instead, we employ the self-evaluated degree of good social relations within the village as a 
proxy of social stability at the village level. Following previous research such as Knack and 
Keefer (1997), Ke and Zhang (2003), we assume a causal link between social stability, higher 
incentives and lower risks for households’ economic activities, and better regional growth 
performance. Specifically, we utilize two attitudinal questions to heads of households. These 
questions are: “Do you think that there is a good relationship among households belonging to 
different villagers’ small groups (cunmin xiaozu)?” and “Do you think that there is a good 
relationship among households belonging to different family groups (jiazu)?” To measure the   11
social relationship within the village, we categorized the answers into points ranging from 
five (strongly agree) to one (strongly disagree) and then summed these points to create a scale 
with a maximum of 10. Then we took the average scale at the village level (as shown in Table 
2, the grand average of the sample villages is 7.568). 
Table 4 here 
Table 4 reports the estimation results. The first column of the table summarizes the 
results of the robust regression after adding the social capital variable. It suggests that villages 
having better social relations were likely to experience higher growth during the 1990s. 
However, the empirical analysis of social capital inevitably encounters the problem of 
endogeneity. It should be noted that the measure of village social capital is based on an 
attitudinal variable representing villagers’ perceptions in 2002. Therefore it can be claimed 
that good social relationships at the village level might be an outcome of income growth, not 
a cause of growth. 
Therefore, we check the endogeneity of the social capital variable by employing the IV 
method. The second column of Table 4 reports the estimation results of the growth equation 
using village size (total population in 2002) and the level of “general trust” as instruments. 
Regarding the measurement of general trust, we utilize another attitudinal question to the 
heads of households: “Do you agree that, generally speaking, most people cannot be trusted?” 
According to the answers to this question, we categorized the heads of households into either 
the “high trust” group (“strongly disagree” or “disagree”) and “low trust” group (“strongly 
agree”, “agree”, or “do not know/hard to say”) and then calculated the percentage of “high 
trust group” households among all sample households (see Table 2 for summary statistics). 
By conducting the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test, we find that the null hypothesis (OLS   12
estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, that is, any endogeneity 
among the regressors would not have deleterious effects on OLS) is rejected at the five 
percent significance level, suggesting that the IV method is required. The estimation results of 
the IV regression also show a positive and significant effect of the relevant social capital 
variable. Thus, we conclude with some confidence that good social relations within a village 
have a significant positive influence on income growth. 
It is interesting to examine whether the role of social capital differs by the level of 
economic development. We divided the sample villages into a high-income group and a low-
income group by median value of the initial income (per capita income in 1990) and 
conducted the IV estimations separately for the two groups. Table 5 reports the results. Social 
capital is found to be insignificant in the high-income group, whereas education is significant 
in both the high- and low-income groups. This finding is important from the standpoint of 
public policy for rural development in China. First, it implies that stable social conditions at 
the local level play a more important role in areas where the overall level of economic 
development is low and the formal institutional infrastructures (for example, the financial and 
governing abilities of local government) are supposed to be weak. Second, the finding that the 
initial level of education equally affects subsequent growth in the high- and low-income 
groups confirms the significance of recent policy arrangements to raise the quality of 
education in low-income regions. 
Table 5 here 
As discussed above, we assume a causal link between stable social conditions and 
higher incentives for economic activities. To test this link empirically, we examine whether 
village-level social capital correlates with peasants’ microentrepreneurship. Specifically, we   13
                                                
ask the heads of households another attitudinal question: “Are you active in adopting new 
agricultural technology?” The possible answers are three points (“very positive”), two points 
(“moderately positive”), and one point (“not so positive”). We took the average of the points 
at the village level and categorized them into a rank variable: three (positive group, average 
point ≥ 2.5), two (intermediate group, average point ≥ 2 and < 2.5), and one (negative group, 
average point < 2).
6 We use this rank variable as the dependent variable and conduct a logit 
regression. Because the dependent variable is ranked but does not follow a natural ranking 
scheme, we estimate a maximum-likelihood stereotype logistic regression. This method is a 
compromise between ordered logistic and multinomial logit models and can be utilized when 
we are unsure of the ordering (Anderson 1984). The focal explanatory variable is the above-
mentioned measure of village social relations capital. As controlling variables, we employ the 
following three village-level variables: educational level (average years of education in 2002), 
income level (log of per capita annual household income in 2002), and land endowment (per 
capita arable land and its square term in 2002). It should be noted that income level represents 
not only the overall level of economic development but also a proxy of villages’ 
industrial/employment structures. Because high-income villages tend to depend less on 
agriculture, we expect a negative coefficient for this controlling variable. 
Table 6 here 
Table 6 reports the estimation result. We find, with other factors being equal, that 
peasants who live in villages where there are good social relations are more likely to have a 
positive attitude toward new agricultural technology. The coefficients for controlling 
 
6 “Do not know/hard to say” is included in the third group.   14
variables are also reasonable. Educational level has a statistically significant positive effect on 
the attitude toward new agricultural technology. The significant negative coefficient for 
income level indirectly suggests that peasants are not interested in new agricultural 
technology where they depend less on agricultural activities. Land endowment has a nonlinear, 
inverted U-shaped relation to the attitude toward new technology, suggesting that both poor 
and rich land endowments tend to reduce the incentive to adopt new technology for more 
intensive production. 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper, using a simple cross-sectional growth regression framework, examined the 
determinants of income growth at the village level. The major findings can be summarized as 
follows. First, we have confirmed the significant positive impact of the initial level of human 
capital, as well as the initial condition of physical infrastructure, on subsequent growth 
performance. This is consistent with the previous cross-country/regional growth literature. 
Second, the estimation result employing social capital suggests that stable social relations at 
the local level can also promote regional growth. Although the detailed mechanisms that link 
social capital to growth at the local level are to be investigated in future research, we found 
that the village-level social capital correlates positively with peasants’ microentrepreneurship. 
Third, regarding the development of lower income regions, our findings suggest that public 
policy promoting social stability should be strengthened, as well as increasing financial 
support for rural education and infrastructure construction. More detailed analyses on the 
political economy at the village level, including the role of local governance and public 
finance, will be investigated in future research.   15
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Table 1 Regional disparity of village mean income, 2002 







Village mean income 
 
2,471 3,518  2,068  1,653 
Disparity in village mean income across 
macro-regions (overall mean = 100) 
 
100 142  84  67 













0.143 0.128 0.041 0.086 
Decomposition of Theil index by province (%)     
Within-province inequality   40 
 
49 92 80 
Between-province disparity  60 
 
51 8  20 
Number of observations  951 
 
346 320 285 
Source:  For this table and the following tables, all data are from the 2002 CHIP village data 
set. 
Notes:  Village mean income is per capita annual net household income in 2002 collected 
from the village questionnaire. Both the Gini and the Theil measures are weighted by 
village population in 2002. Ten villages are omitted because of missing data.   18
Table 2 Data descriptions and summary statistics for baseline and extended estimations 
Variables Mean  Std.  dev. Description 
Dependent variable 
Annual income growth rate 1990–2002 
0.056 0.043 Average annual growth rate of village mean 
income (per capita annual net household 
income) in 2002 yuan inflated by the rural 
CPI at the national level 
Explanatory variables for baseline estimation 
Initial level of income   1343.30 880.35 Village mean income in 1990 (in 2002 yuan 
deflated by the rural CPI) 
Population growth  0.005 0.014 Average annual rate of population growth 
1998–2002 
(population data for 1990 not available) 
Initial level of human capital   6.437 1.287 Estimated average years of education of 
working population in 1990 (estimated based 
on the household questionnaire) 
Initial condition of physical 
infrastructure 
Equipped with electricity before 1969 
 
0.277
  Answers by village cadres (not based on 
official records) 
Equipped with electricity in 1970–79  0.350    
Equipped with electricity in 1980–89  0.263    





  Location based on NBS’s official 
geographical categories 
Hilly areas  0.289    
Plains 0.505    
Explanatory variables and instruments for extended estimation 
Social capital (good social relations at 
the village level) 
7.568 1.009 Heads of households’ evaluation of the degree 
of good social relations within the village 
(points ranging from 0 to 10) 
General trust  62.561 28.663 Indicator of general trust of heads of 
households 
Village size  1825.56 1181.55 Total population in 2002 
Number of observations  870     
Notes:  Because of missing data, the number of observations for the growth regression and 
relating empirical analyses is 881. All the villages of Hunan province are omitted 
because the data of village mean income for 1990 are missing.   19
Table 3 Baseline growth regression, 1990–2002 
Dependent variable: Annual growth rate 
of village mean income 1990–2002 
 
(1) OLS  (2) Robust regression 
Population growth   –0.239  –0.271 
 (2.93)***  (3.39)*** 
    
Initial level of education  0.004  0.004 
 (4.26)***  (3.80)*** 
    
Log of initial income  –0.047  –0.048 
 (23.41)***  (24.23)*** 
    
Equipped with electricity in 1970–79  –0.008  –0.010 
 (2.81)***  (3.31)*** 
    
Equipped with electricity in 1980–89  –0.016  –0.014 
 (4.75)***  (4.34)*** 
    
Equipped with electricity after 1990  –0.023  –0.023 
 (5.11)***  (5.18)*** 
    
Mountainous area   –0.007  –0.007 
 (2.19)**  (2.10)** 
    
Plains 0.008  0.009 
 (2.94)***  (3.36)*** 
    
Constant 0.369  0.375 
 (23.75)***  (24.23)*** 
Number of observations  870  870 
Adjusted R-squared  0.386  0.404 
F statistic (8, 861)  69.39  74.64 
Prob. > F  0.000  0.000 
Notes:  Omitted variables are equipped with electricity before 1969 and hilly areas. Absolute 
value of t statistics in parentheses. * denotes statistically significant at the 10% level; 
** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level respectively.   20
Table 4 Growth regression with social capital (robust regression and IV) 








Population growth   –0.268  –0.237 
 (3.35)***  (2.63)*** 
Initial level of education  0.003  0.003 
 (3.72)***  (3.10)*** 
Log of initial income  –0.048  –0.049 
 (24.29)***  (20.03)*** 
Equipped with electricity in 1970–79  –0.009  –0.008 
 (3.24)***  (2.41)** 
Equipped with electricity in 1980–89  –0.014  –0.015 
 (4.25)***  (4.15)*** 
Equipped with electricity after 1990  –0.023  –0.028 
 (5.30)***  (5.02)*** 
Mountainous area   –0.007  –0.004 
 (2.02)**  (1.10) 
Plains 0.009  0.007 
 (3.29)***  (2.29)** 
Social capital at the village level  0.002  0.018 
 (1.94)*  (2.02)** 
Constant 0.361  0.250 
 (21.39)***  (4.10)*** 
Number of observations  870  870 
Adjusted R-squared  0.405   
Centered R-squared    0.250 
F statistic  (9, 860) 66.67  (9, 859) 50.37
Prob. > F  0.000  0.000 
Test of endogeneity 
Durbin–Wu–Hausman chi square test 
 4.125 
(p = 0.041) 
Test of overidentification 
Sargan statistic 
 0.188 
(p = 0.665) 
Notes:  Instrumented variable is social capital at the village level, instruments are the 
measure of general trust and village size. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 
1% level respectively.   21
Table 5 Comparison of high and low income groups (IV estimation) 
Dependent variable: Annual growth rate of village 








Population growth   –0.221  –0.109 
 (0.11)  (0.61) 
Initial level of education  0.002  0.004 
 (1.78)*  (1.93)* 
Log of initial income  –0.035  –0.062 
 (7.66)***  (8.88)*** 
Equipped with electricity in 1970–79  –0.003  –0.017 
 (0.96)  (2.33)** 
Equipped with electricity in 1980–89  –0.013  –0.020 
 (3.19)***  (2.61)*** 
Equipped with electricity after 1990  –0.009  –0.042 
 (1.19)  (3.98)*** 
Mountainous area   0.006  –0.013 
 (1.25)  (1.94)* 
Plains 0.011  –0.007 
 (3.24)***  (0.89) 
Social capital at the village level  0.001  0.035 
 (0.11)  (1.97)* 
Constant 0.272  0.218 
 (4.63)***  (1.79)* 
Number of observations  438  432 
Adjusted R-squared     
Centered R-squared  0.160  0.218 
F statistic  (9, 427) 9.00  (9, 421) 13.24
Prob. > F  0.000  0.000 
Test of endogeneity 
Durbin–Wu–Hausman chi square test 
0.000 
(p = 0.990) 
6.139 
(p = 0.013) 
Test of overidentification 
Sargan statistic 
0.178 
(p = 0.673) 
0.001 
(p = 0.971) 
Notes:  Instrumented variable and instruments are the same in Table 4. Sample villages are 
divided into two groups by the median of the initial income (per capita income in 
1990). The absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * denotes statistically 
significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level respectively.   22
Table 6 Determinants of attitude toward new agricultural technology (stereotype logit 
regression) 
Dependent variable: Rank variable ranges from 3 (very positive) to 1 (not positive) indicating 
heads of households’ self-evaluated attitude toward new agricultural technology 
 
Social capital at the village level  0.801 
 (6.95)*** 
Initial level of education  0.137 
 (1.70)* 
Log of village mean income 2002  –0.455 
 (2.34)** 
Per capita land endowment  0.387 
 (2.82)*** 
Square term of per capita land endowment  –0.030 
 (1.98)** 
  
Number of observations  859 
Wald chi squared (Prob. > chi squared)  68.24 (0.000) 
Log likelihood  –804.476 
Notes:  Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * denotes statistically significant at the 
10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level respectively. 
 